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Abstract
Stern-judging is one of the best-known assessment rules in indirect reciprocity.
Indirect reciprocity is a fundamental mechanism for the evolution of cooperation.
It relies on mutual monitoring and assessments, i.e., individuals judge, following
their own assessment rules, whether other individuals are “good” or “bad” ac-
cording to information on their past behaviors. Among many assessment rules,
stern-judging is known to provide stable cooperation in a population, as ob-
served when all members in the population know all about others’ behaviors
(public information case) and when the members never commit an assessment
error. In this paper, the effect of assessment error and private information on
stern-judging is investigated. By analyzing the image matrix, which describes
who is good in the eyes of whom in the population, we analytically show that
private information and assessment error cause the collapse of stern-judging: all
individuals assess other individuals as “good” at random with a probability of
1/2.
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1. Introduction
“I help you and you help me”. Such cooperative relationships can be often
found in biological systems and human societies. Cooperative behaviors are
clearly important to make biological and human societies effective and smooth.
However, evolutionary biologists and social scientists have long been puzzled
about the origin of cooperation [1]. Recently, scientists from a variety of fields
such as economics, mathematics or even physics tackle the puzzle using the
power of mathematics [2].
This puzzle is called the social dilemma or the free rider problem [3]. This
can be described as follows: (1) individuals in a society have binary choices:
cooperation (help others) or defection (refuse to help others), (2) a society
consisting of cooperators is more profitable than that with only defectors, (3)
but, within a society, individual defectors do better than individual cooperators,
since cooperators must incur a cost to help others, while defectors do not. Thus
it is more advantageous for individuals to choose defection regardless of what
other individuals choose, which, by natural selection or social learning, leads to
a society with only defectors. The fundamental issue therefore is to explain why
cooperation is so ubiquitous in the real world.
Indirect reciprocity is one of the basic mechanisms known to sustain mutual
cooperation among individuals [4–8]. It is found not only in human societies
[9–16] but also in biological systems [17]. Indirect reciprocity is also a boosting
mechanism of group formation [18] and in-group favouritism [19–21], another
aspect of human cooperation. This mechanism relies on the abilities of individ-
uals to monitor the interactions of others, and to assess those interactions using
moral sense even when they are not personally engaged in them [22–33].
If the action of an individual is assessed as bad in the population, or in other
words, if the individual is burdened with a bad image in the society, the indi-
vidual will not be given help from members of that society anymore. Thus, by
indirect reciprocity, helpful actions can be channeled away from bad individuals,
and directed to good individuals. Therefore, if defectors are labeled with a bad
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name and if a good image is assigned to just helpers, indirect reciprocity makes
it beneficial to help others, even when the helpful actions incur some cost to
the helpers. As a result, members in a society opt to help each other so that
cooperative relationships evolve.
In assessing others’ behaviors, members follow an assessment rule by which
to judge the acts of others as good or bad. This can be viewed as an elementary
model of a social norm of the society. There are clearly many possibilities for
those rules, each of which corresponds to a moral culture of a society (i.e., what
are regarded as good acts and what are bad acts in the society) [34, 35].
The simplest rule only takes it into account whether help is given or not and
does not use any other information such as who provided the help to whom.
Plausibly, a good image is assigned to individuals who give help to others and
a bad image to individuals who refuse to help [23].
However, this simple assessment rule gives rise to an inconsistency and can-
not provide a stable cooperation in a population. Using this rule, refusing to
help is always assigned a bad image. Therefore, when an individual i refuses
to help j because j is a bad person, i is perceived by other individuals as bad,
although they would have also refused to help j. And those individuals who re-
fused to help i become bad again. In this way, bad images are copied and spread
in the population so that in the end the population consists of bad individuals.
This example indicates that not all assessment rules lead to stable coop-
eration. In fact, Ohtsuki and Iwasa [35, 36] showed that, assuming binary
assessments (i.e., a world where there are only good and bad assessments), only
eight lead to a stable regime of mutual cooperation among all possible rules.
These are called the leading eight. Two of these rules are based on the so called
second-order assessments which take into account whether the image of the re-
cipient is good or bad as well as whether help is given or not. The other six
are based on third-order assessments which use the additional information on
whether the donor is good or bad [34].
In order to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these rules, Uchida
and Sigmund [37] proposed a method to compare different assessment models.
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They applied this method to compare the two second-order assessment rules
and analytically showed that the sterner second-order rule called stern-judging
[38] wins in the sense that players using stern-judging are more likely to earn
a higher payoff than players following the other milder rule (called standing)
[6]. Other papers based on numerical simulations also argue the advantages of
stern-judging [34, 39, 40].
These studies, however, assume that the information is public and that no
personal assessment error occurs, i.e., all members in a population can know
about the behaviors of all others and they assess the behaviors according to
their assessment rules without any personal mistake. As a result, all individuals
always agree about an assessment of other individuals. Daily experience, how-
ever, tells us that persons can have different information [29, 41] and that they
can hold personal misconceptions when assessing others [42]. Such different in-
formation and mis-perceptions can lead to a mismatch between the opinions of
individuals, and possibly cause the collapse of assessment rules that are deemed
successful in the case of public information without assessment errors. As a first
step to theoretically investigating the effects of assessment errors and private
information on the leading eight, we consider stern-judging in this paper.
In the literature, the impact of private information is often investigated nu-
merically by using the concept of image matrix [41]. The image matrix describes
who is good in the eyes of whom in the population. However, its “rigorous anal-
ysis seems to offer considerable challenges” [43]. In this paper, we assume that
only some of the members in a population can observe each game and that the
observers can personally make a mistake in assessing the donor in the game.
Under this setting, and by investigating image matrix, we analytically calculate
the proportion of good individuals in a society in which stern-judging pervades
as a social norm. We find that the proportion of good individuals is always
1/2 with the exception of the special case of public information without any
assessment error.
The following sections describe the model and the methods of analysis, then
derive the results, and discuss both the model and outcomes.
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2. The Model
A large, well-mixed population of players is considered. From time to time,
two players are chosen at random from the population and they engage in a
one-shot donation game: a coin toss decides who plays the role of potential
donor and who is recipient. The donor decides whether or not to help the
recipient, at a personal cost c. If the donor chooses to help, the recipient gains
a benefit b > c; otherwise the recipient obtains nothing. Each individual in the
population experiences such donation games many times [44].
In indirect reciprocity, individuals in the population have an ability to ob-
serve other individuals. Each game is observed by a fraction q of the population.
This assumption is different from that of Uchida and Sigmund [37] who assume
that all individuals perfectly observe all interactions, and from Ohtsuki and
Iwasa [35, 36] who assume that one randomly chosen individual acts as a referee
and whose assessment is perfectly representative of all other individuals. These
two studies correspond to q = 1. In this paper, the case of private information,
i.e., q < 1 is investigated.
If an individual observes a game, the individual evaluates the action of the
donor in the game. Each individual has an assessment rule by which to judge
the action of the donor. We assume a binary judgment: either the label “good”
or “bad” is assigned to the donor. In this paper, the assessment rule called
stern-judging is considered. Stern-judging views those as good who, in their
previous game, gave help to a good recipient or refused help to a bad recipient
[36, 38].
We assume that an assessment error occurs with a small probability. With
a probability µ, an observer assigns the opposite assessment value to the as-
sessment value given by the stern-judging. This kind of mis-perception occurs
individually, therefore, leads to a difference in the opinions (assessments) of
players in the population, even when they follow the same assessment rule.
Each individual determines whether or not to help the recipient in a game
according to the current image of the recipient (i.e., whether the recipient is good
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or bad). If the recipient is viewed as good in the eyes of the potential donor,
the recipient will be given help, or otherwise refused to help. But the donor can
commit an implementation error: with a certain probability ǫ, the donor fails
to implement an intended help. Following previous studies, an intended refusal
is assumed to be always carried out [22, 25, 35, 36].
The payoff a random recipient obtains from a random donor depends on the
frequency of good individuals in the population. Let r denote the probability
that a random individual positively assesses another random individual. Then
the expected payoff is given by ǫ¯r(b − c) with ǫ¯ = 1 − ǫ. The fully cooperative
population corresponds to r = 1 and the fully defective population to r = 0. In
the next section, we describe how the value of r is determined.
3. Image matrix
Let βij denote the image of player j in the eyes of player i. The values
βij = 1 and βij = 0 correspond to the situations where i thinks that j is good
and bad respectively. The matrix (βij) is called the image matrix [41]. Then
the value of r is the mean of all the elements of (βij).
The image matrix will be updated when a game is played. The update rule is
described as follows: let u, v 6= u andW denote the donor, the recipient and the
set of observers respectively, chosen at random from the whole population. The
number of observers is qN , where N is the total number of individuals in the
population, which will be assumed to be infinite for an analytical calculation.
Then the image matrix after the game is given by
β′ij =


βij (i /∈ W ∨ j 6= u),
f (i)(αu, βiv) (i ∈ W ∧ j = u),
(1)
where αu is the action of u toward v in the game. Using the abbreviation C
for “help”, D for “refuse”, αu = D always if βuv = 0, or with probability ǫ if
βuv = 1 due to the implementation error. Otherwise αu = C.
The function f (i)(α, β) ∈ {0, 1} with α ∈ {C,D} and β ∈ {0, 1} is the
assessment, from the viewpoint of i, if the donor chooses action α towards the
6
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Figure 1: Update of the image matrix. The donor, the recipient and one of the observers
at the game are denoted by u, v and w respectively. In the figure, β′wu denotes the new
assessment of donor u in the eyes of observer w ∈ W . The new assessment depends on the
current assessment of v both in the eyes of u (βuv) and w (βwv): (a) βuv = βwv = 1, (b)
βuv = 0, βwv = 1, (c) βuv = 1, βwv = 0, (d) βuv = βwv = 0.
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β−recipient. For stern-judging, f (i)(C, 1) = f (i)(D, 0) = 1 and f (i)(C, 0) =
f (i)(D, 1) = 0 with probability 1 − µ (i.e., i made a correct assessment), and
f (i)(C, 1) = f (i)(D, 0) = 0 and f (i)(C, 0) = f (i)(D, 1) = 1 with probability µ
(i.e, i made a mistake).
For any given updating step, only the u−column of the image matrix changes
its values. Since the action αu is probabilistically determined by βuv, the new
assessment β′wu in the eyes of observer w ∈ W probabilistically depends on the
assessments of recipient v both in the eyes of u (βuv) and w (βwv) before the
game. That is to say, the updated image matrix is probabilistically determined
by the old image matrix, which yields a stochastic process on the image matrix.
This process describes the assessment dynamics, which determines who has a
good image in the eyes of whom in the population. For example, if βuv = 1
and βwv = 0, the new assessment β
′
wu is 0 with probability ǫ¯µ¯+ ǫµ and 1 with
probability ǫ¯µ+ ǫµ¯ (See Fig. 1 (c)). Fig. 1 illustrates how the image matrix is
updated by Eq. (1) for all cases.
4. Results
In Fig.2, we show an example of the time evolution of the image matrix with
parameters q = 0.99, µ = 0.01 andN = 100. We note that the diagonal elements
of the image matrix (i.e., self-images) are handled differently in simulations. We
assumed that a selected donor (u) can always observe the action of u (i.e., u
is always included in the set of observers when u plays). Therefore, in each
updating step, the diagonal element βuu is updated. However, diagonal elements
of the image matrix are of no interest, since the information of diagonal elements
is never used when deciding an action in a game or when assessing others. That
is, diagonal elements do not affect off-diagonal elements, which represent images
of others.
We assumed that, initially, there are only good individuals (βij = 1 for all
i and j). Due to the implementation error, bad individuals appear. At the
beginning (for instance after 50 updates), we show some stripes in the image
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matrix. This means that almost all individuals have the same image to a given
player since q is close to 1 and µ is close to 0. But as time evolves, mismatches
between individuals spread in the image matrix and after 5000 updates, the
image matrix reaches a disordered state. According to numerical simulations,
the number of good individuals (i.e., the number of white dots in the image
matrix) and the number of bad individuals become the same after a long period
of time.
In order to derive the proportion of good individuals r at equilibrium, select
players i, j and k respectively at random from the population, and consider the
situation where j is deciding whether or not to help k, and i is a third party
who can be selected as an observer. Let us define the possible events as follows:
A = i is selected as an observer,
B = j intends to help k and help is actually given,
C = i positively assesses the action of j in event B,
D = j intends to help k but help is not given,
E = i positively assesses the action of j in event D,
F = j decides not to help k,
G = i positively assesses the action of j in event F ,
H = i is not selected as an observer,
I = i has a good image of j.
Then at equiibrium, the following equality holds:
r = P [A](P [B ∧ C] + P [D ∧ E] + P [F ∧G]) + P [H ∧ I], (2)
where P [X ] is the probability that event X occurs. For example, when the
events A,B and C occur at once, a randomly chosen individual i has a good
image of another randomly chosen individual j after the game.
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Figure 2: A sample path of the time evolution of image matrix (βij) with parameters q = 0.99
and µ = 0.01. Image matrices are shown after 50 updates (top-left), 200 updates (top-middle),
700 updates (top-right), 1300 updates (bottom-left), 2000 updates (bottom-middle) and 5000
updates (bottom-right). Initially all individuals are good:βij = 1 for all i and j. The good
image βij = 1 corresponds to a white dot and the bad image βij = 0 to a black dot. Each
population has 100 individuals.
The probabilities in Eq.(2) are given by
P [A] = q,
P [B ∧ C] = ǫ¯(r11µ¯+ r10µ),
P [D ∧E] = ǫ(r10µ¯+ r11µ),
P [F ∧G] = (r00µ¯+ r01µ),
P [H ∧ I] = (1− q)r,
where r11 is the probability that two random players (i, j) both have a good
image of another random player (k), r10 is the probability that a random in-
dividual j as a donor has a good image of k but a random individual i as an
observer has a bad image of k, and so on. Since r10 = r01 holds because we se-
lect i and j at random, these probabilities can be denoted by a common symbol
r1/2.
For the case of perfect information (q = 1) without an assessment error
(µ = 0), r11 = r, r1/2 = 0 and r00 = 1 − r because there is no difference in the
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opinions of any two individuals. In this case, Eq.(2) yields the solution 1/(1+ ǫ)
[36, 45]. For the opposite extreme case where q is very small, the mean field
approximation is valid: r11 = r
2, r1/2 = r(1 − r) and r00 = (1 − r)
2 [41, 43].
Then from the Eq.(2), we find two solutions: one is r = 1/2 regardless of ǫ and
µ and the other is the meaningless solution r = µ¯/(ǫ¯(1− 2µ)) > 1.
For the intermediate cases where q < 1 or µ > 0, we need additional three
equations to estimate the second order unknowns r11, r1/2 and r00. For two
of these three equations, we can use trivial relations between these variables:
r11 + r10 = r and r10 + r00 = 1 − r. Therefore, the essential second order
unknown is only r11.
Now let us randomly pick two individuals i1 and i2 who may observe the
action of j. We define the possible events as follows:
A2 = i1 and i2 are selected as observers,
C2 = i1 and i2 positively assess the action of j in B,
E2 = i1 and i2 positively assess the action of j in D,
G2 = i1 and i2 positively assess the action of j in F .
Then we find the equality for r11:
r11 = P [A2](P [B ∧ C2] + P [D ∧ E2] + P [F ∧G2])
+2P [A](P [B ∧ C] + P [D ∧ E] + P [F ∧G])
×P [H ∧ I] + (1− q)2r11. (3)
For instance, P [A]P [B ∧ C] in the second term is the probability that i1 is an
observer who perceives the action of j as good after j helps and P [H ∧ I] is the
probability that i2 is not an observer who has a good image of j. If the events
A,B,C,H and I occur, both i1 and i2 have a good image of j after the game.
Note that these probabilities are independent, since the probability P [A]P [B∧
C] depends on the current image of k in the eyes of i1 and j, wheres P [H ∧ I]
is a function of the current image of j in the eyes of i2 (because the assessment
of j in the eyes of i1 and j and that of k in the eyes of i2 have been made
independently).
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The last them (1− q)2r11 is the probability that i1 and i2 who have a good
image of j are not selected as observers. The probabilities in the first term are
given by
P [A2] = q
2,
P [B ∧ C2] = ǫ¯(r111µ¯
2 + (r101 + r110)µ¯µ+ r100µ
2),
P [D ∧ E2] = ǫ(r111µ
2 + (r101 + r110)µ¯µ+ r100µ¯
2),
P [F ∧G2] = r000µ¯
2 + (r001 + r010)µ¯µ+ r011µ
2,
where, for example, r111 is the probability that j, i1 and i2 all have a good
image of k and r101 that j and i2 have a good image but i1 has a bad image of
k; and so on. Again r110 = r101 = r011 =: r2/3 and r001 = r010 = r100 =: r1/3
hold. Therefore we have four third order unknowns (r111, r2/3, r1/3 and r000).
Furthermore because of the trivial relations r111 + r2/3 = r11, r2/3 + r1/3 =
r1/2, r1/3 + r000 = r00, the essential third order unknown is only r111.
However, taking into account all of the obtained relations above and calcu-
lating the first term in Eq.(3), we find that the third order variable is canceled
out:
P [B ∧ C2] + P [D ∧ E2] + P [F ∧G2] = (ǫ¯µ¯
2 + ǫµ2)r11
+(ǫ¯µ2 − ǫ¯µ¯2 + 2µ¯µ)r1/2 + µ¯
2r00.
Thus Eqs.(2) and (3) yield a closed equation system for unknowns r and r11.
Especially, Eq.(2) is linear in r and r11 and we can express r11 by r. Inserting
this expression into r11 in Eq.(3), we find a quadratic equation for r. Solving this
equation leads to two solutions, namely r = 1/2 and the meaningless solution
r = R1/R2 with R1 = µ¯(1 − q + µq + ǫµq − 2ǫµ
2q) > R2 = ǫ¯(1 − 2µ)(1 − q).
That is to say, r = 1/2 is the unique solution for q < 1 or for µ > 0.
5. Discussion
We found that private information and assessment errors have a striking
effect on stern-judging: Any difference or mismatch between images among
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individuals due to private information and assessment errors spread in a popu-
lation so that individuals assess each other as good at random with probability
1/2 in the end.
But why does stern-judging collapse, even though it is highly successful in
the case of public information without personal assessment errors? The point is
that stern-judging does not have any mechanism (or a function) which repairs
a mismatch in the opinions between two observers. In fact, if two observers
with stern-judging disagree about a given player, this difference remains, no
matter which action the observed player chooses and whoever the recipient is.
Therefore once a new mismatch between two individuals has appeared, these
individuals continue to have different opinions. As a result, the image matrix
becomes totally disordered.
This indicates that, besides private information and personal assessment
errors, there can be more factors that cause mismatches and lead to a collapse
of stern-judging. For instance, in this paper, the imperfectness of information
can be interpreted both by direct and indirect observation models. In our model,
players in a population can obtain information about the interactions of others
either by direct observation, or by rumor or gossip. In the case of rumor or
gossip, the transmitted information is assumed to always be correct even though
the information is not passed to all individuals. In the literature however, there
is a model that includes incorrect rumors [46]. Such incorrect rumors can also
cause a mismatch of images if the rumor is transmitted individually, therefore
they can also lead to the collapse of stern-judging.
Note that our definition of imperfectness of information is just one form.
Other forms of imperfect information can be found in literature [24, 47–49].
Nowak and Sigmund [24] assumed that each player either knows or does not
know the reputation of another player, and assumes a good reputation by de-
fault (if a player does not know the reputation). Further, Brandt and Sigmund
[48] allowed q to grow with age and found that cooperation can then be stably
maintained. Mohtashemi and Mui [49] modified the model of Nowak and Sig-
mund [24] by assuming that the information spreads through social networks.
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They derived a condition for q which is similar to the inequality found by Nowak
and Sigmund [24]. In those studies, the information is not perfect but public.
How this imperfectness affects stern-judging is an interesting question, since, in
this case, a mismatch between individuals can be repaired because the informa-
tion is public.
In this paper, the effects of private information and assessment errors on
other best-studied assessment models such as scoring (first-order) [23] or stand-
ing (second-order) [6] are not investigated. Standing is the other second-order
assessment rule in the leading eight. Since there is experimental evidence to
support the view that higher-order assessment can overtax human cognitive
abilities [50], it will be interesting to theoretically investigate the effects of fac-
tors that cause disagreements between individuals on those assessment rules. At
least in this paper, we showed that private information and assessment errors
strikingly affect one of the best-known assessment models.
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